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Insurance intermediation services are information services which exhibit strong information 
asymmetries. We empirically analyze whether signaling works in the German market for 
insurance intermediation services. For this a signal must increase service quality and be 
easily identifiable by consumers so that it pays for intermediaries to spend the related costs. 
By using OLS and logit estimations we test whether intermediary type, reputational activities 
and a variety of signaling instruments work as credible signals. Our findings confirm the 
main hypotheses derived from signaling theory as to the poor working of market forces in 
markets for information services. Accordingly, public policy regulation is necessary to 
mitigate the resulting problems. 
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1. Introduction  
Anecdotal complaints about the poor performance of insurance intermediaries are a recurrent 
topic in everyday accounts of one’s experiences when shopping for insurance. These 
impressions are confirmed by a number of descriptive and other studies (see section 5 below). 
It is well-established that incomplete, misleading or even false information by insurance 
intermediaries is one of the main problems in this industry.  
Insurance products are very complex goods. It is difficult for consumers to correctly assess 
their characteristics before purchasing them. Therefore, insurance intermediaries assist 
consumers by economizing on search costs, in particular on information and transaction costs. 
Exclusive or independent agents and insurance brokers are the main distribution channels for 
insurance products. They not only act as agents for insurance companies in marketing and 
distributing their products, but also as agents for consumers in finding well-matching 
insurance products. However, also the quality of the information services provided by 
insurance intermediaries is not fully observable before purchase. Thus, these information 
services are experience and credence goods. Accordingly, for consumers, incomplete and 
asymmetric information about the quality of insurance products is replaced by incomplete and 
asymmetric information about the quality of the counseling services provided by insurance 
intermediaries.  
According to information economics, such incomplete information may result in adverse 
selection and/or moral hazard behavior. Signaling theory shows that for experience goods and 
services there are means which allow firms to credibly signal that they provide high quality. 
In this case, market forces set incentives to invest in credible signals and thus reduce adverse 
selection (Riley 2001). In this paper we empirically analyze whether signaling works in the 
market for insurance intermediation services. Thus, we contribute to the empirical testing of 
signaling theory. Besides, since reputation is of particular importance in markets of expert 
services, we study in more detail its working in the market for insurance intermediation 
services.  
The questions addressed in this paper are of interest not only from an academic perspective. 
They have wide ranging implications for consumers, insurance intermediaries, and public 
policy regulators. For consumers it is important to know which activities of insurance 
intermediaries do indeed credibly signal high service quality. For insurance intermediaries it 
is important to know which activities do not only credibly signal high service quality, but also  
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pay off in economic terms, since signaling is a costly activity. And finally, from a public 
policy point of view our analysis is of interest, since regulation is necessary only as far as 
market forces do not work in reducing information asymmetries.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we shortly summarize the main reasoning 
of signaling theory and derive hypotheses to be tested empirically. Section 3 discusses the 
main signals applicable in the market for insurance intermediation services. Section 4 gives a 
short overview of the relevant empirical literature. Data, variables and estimation methods are 
presented in section 5, while the econometric results are discussed in section 6. Section 7 
concludes and discusses the implications of our findings. 
2. Signaling Theory and Hypotheses 
Insurance intermediaries provide information and advisory services throughout all transaction 
stages for consumers when concluding insurance contracts (Eckardt 2007, 1-21). But 
consumers act under incomplete and asymmetric information about the true quality of an 
intermediary’s services. These services are experience and credence goods (Nelson 1970; 
Darby and Karni 1973). A consumer cannot assess the service quality provided by competing 
insurance intermediaries in advance, but only after information and advice have been 
“consumed”, i.e. after an experience. However, even this is often barely possible, thus 
credence is needed. Especially for long-term insurance products like old-age or disability 
insurance, the quality of the information and advice given can be evaluated only after the 
insured risk has actually occurred – which often takes place decades later. Common business 
practices, which have evolved over time, add to the lack of transparency. This holds true in 
particular for remuneration practices and disclosure requirements about business relations 
between intermediaries and insurance companies. Consequently, consumers have only very 
limited information about potential conflicts of interest and potential bias in the information 
and advice given by insurance intermediaries. As a consequence of the intermediary’s 
privately held information, adverse selection and/ or moral hazard may occur, resulting in 
rather low service quality (Kurland 1995, 1996).  
Signaling theory shows how providers of better service (or product) quality can mitigate such 
information asymmetries and lessen the resulting problems of adverse selection (Spence 1973, 
2002; Ippolito 1990; Molho 1997, 61-80; Kirmani and Rao 2000; Riley 2001). The main 
signals discussed in the literature are investment in reputation, advertising, certificates and 
licensing, guarantees or warranties and low introductory prices (Kirmani and Rao 2000; Kreps 
1990; Riley 2001). For a signal to be credible, so that it correctly communicates the provision  
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of high quality services, it is a necessary condition that it does not pay for low quality 
providers to imitate it. Only then a separating equilibrium occurs, where consumers can rely 
on a signaling firm indeed providing high quality services, while non-signaling firms will 
provide low quality services. 
For a signal to be credible, firms have to make a commitment according to which they will 
lose money if falsely signaling high quality services, or that involves sunk costs which will be 
recovered only in case of repeated transactions. Up-front expenditures like investment in 
advertising or reputation will be recovered only if there are repeat sales in the future.
1 These, 
however, will take place only in case that a signaling firm indeed provides high quality 
services. Otherwise consumers will refrain from repeated purchases and perhaps even 
communicate their negative experiences to others. Accordingly, low quality firms would 
realize a loss over time when mimicking such costly signals. Therefore, signaling reduces 
information asymmetries, if high quality firms invest so much money in costly signals that 
imitating them does not pay off for low quality competitors.  
According to Kirmani and Rao (2000, 72-73) there are four conditions which must be met for 
signaling to be successful. In the following we shortly discuss whether they apply to 
insurance intermediation services. A main condition is that there is prepurchase information 
scarcity. As we have already argued above, consumers have rather low information about 
insurance intermediaries’ service quality. Nevertheless, they can be reasonably assumed to be 
quality-sensitive, in particular when they shop for long-term personal insurance like old-age, 
disability or health. A second necessary condition is that there is postpurchase information 
clarity. The experience and credence goods’ characteristics of insurance intermediaries’ 
services apply mainly to long-term insurance contracts. For these, consumers are not able to 
unambiguously assess the quality of the information services provided even after contract 
conclusion. Thus, signaling has to be assumed to work rather poorly in regard to these 
aspects. Thirdly, signaling models assume payoff transparency. While consumers are 
supposed to lack information about firms’ true service quality, both firms and consumers are 
assumed to have perfect information about the relevant costs and payoffs and to fully 
understand the rationale behind investments made by firms to signal product quality. That is, 
consumers are assumed to correctly understand that up-front expenditures in signals, like 
reputation or advertising for example, will pay off only in case of repeated transaction. It is a 
                                                 
1   The same holds for low introductory prices of new products.  
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rather strong assumption that consumers are able to correctly identify the economic rationale 
behind a firm’s marketing strategy. However, for service markets it is well established that 
word-of-mouth is one of the most important mechanism to gain good reputation (Zeithaml 
and Bitner 2006, 67, 496, 551). Fourthly, for signaling to work there must be bond 
vulnerability. Only if consumers know and believe that the bond posted by a firm is truly at 
risk, if the firm does not live up to its promise of providing high-quality services, the signal 
will induce quality-sensitive consumers to turn to high-quality firms so that these can recover 
the related signaling costs. Again, this assumption makes strong claims on consumers being 
able to identify correctly the mechanisms that make signaling work. In addition, it is also 
implicitly assumed that firms know what means will work well as credible signals so that low-
quality competitors will not imitate them, while consumers will easily identify them. 
However, designing signaling activities is one of a number of marketing activities, which is 
subject to trial-and-error like all other entrepreneurial behavior. Firms do not have an a priori 
knowledge of what strategies will indeed work as credible signals. Experimenting with 
different signals to find out about the most profitable ones is an important part of firms’ 
marketing strategy. 
Given these requirements, we expect that signaling works only poorly in the market for 
insurance intermediation services. To test empirically whether and what kind of signals work 
for these information services, we derive two hypotheses. For a signal to be credible it must 
correctly indicate better service quality for consumers. Therefore, our first hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 1: Intermediaries who use credible signals provide better (or above average) 
information service quality.   
Secondly, for intermediaries to provide a signal, it must pay off to spend the related signaling 
costs. If a credible signal can be easily identified by quality-sensitive consumers, they will 
react to it by turning to those intermediaries sending it. As a consequence high quality 
intermediaries will realize a higher contract conclusion rate than their competitors. If 
consumers cannot identify whether an intermediary provides a credible signal or not, their 
choice of an intermediary will not be affected by a possible signal. Therefore, our second 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: Intermediaries who use easily identifiable credible signals realize a higher (or 
above average) contract conclusion rate. 
In the following section we shortly discuss possible signals in the market for insurance 
intermediation services.   
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3. Signals in the Market for Insurance Intermediation Services  
In general, signals can be distinguished according to whether they are default-independent or 
default-contingent, with the former requiring up-front expenditures before or during sales 
transactions (Kirmani and Rao 2000). Most of the signals discussed in the following are 
default-independent. This holds for (1) the intermediary type (that is the distribution channel 
an intermediary belongs to), (2) reputation, (3) advertising, (4) certificates and licensing as 
well as for (5) additional costly investment an intermediary incurs. Only (6) voluntary 
property liability insurance, which is akin to a warranty, is default-contingent.   
(1) Intermediary Type 
By deciding about its distribution channel, an insurance intermediary makes claims about the 
quality of his or her information services. The main distribution channels are exclusive agents, 
who distribute insurance products from a single insurance company, and independent agents, 
who offer insurance products from different companies, however, only from one company for 
each line of insurance. In addition there are insurance brokers, who are independent from 
insurance companies, thus providing products from potentially all insurers in the market. 
According to the respective market regulations, stricter rules usually apply to insurance 
brokers in regard of qualification as well as of liability rules, for example. Accordingly, being 
an insurance broker is an easily identifiable means to signal the provision of more 
comprehensive and more objective information about insurance needs and risks than being an 
exclusive or independent agent.  
(2) Reputation 
Reputation also serves as a signal for high quality services (Kreps and Wilson 1982; Milgrom 
and Roberts 1982; Shapiro 1982, 1983; Allen 1984; Wilson 1985; Stiglitz 1989a, 822-831; 
Biglaiser and Friedman 1999). Reputation disseminated through word-of-mouth is widely 
held to be one of the most important signaling instruments for services (Zeithaml and Bitner 
2006, 67, 496, 551). It is difficult to imitate, but easily identifiable by consumers. Since it is 
built up over time, it requires multiple interactions over several periods. High quality services 
are assumed to require higher production costs than low quality services. When a consumer 
learns about a high quality intermediary, she will repeatedly use the same intermediary or 
communicate her experiences about his service quality to others. Due to word-of-mouth, 
reputation for high quality generates additional business and vice versa. However, building up 
a reputation takes time and requires extra costs, while it is lost by simply providing low  
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quality services. On the one hand, cheating on consumers by providing low quality reduces 
costs when producing the low quality service. On the other hand, however, it devalues the 
investment made so far in building reputation as being a high quality firm. While lower 
production costs can be realized only in the current period, the ensuing loss of reputation 
decreases demand over all future periods. Consequently, an intermediary has an incentive to 
permanently provide high quality services, if the discounted net value of the profits thus 
realized exceeds the one time profit from cheating by providing low quality services.  
(3) Advertising 
Advertising is another means of signaling high quality services to overcome adverse selection 
of experience goods due to asymmetric information (Schmalensee 1978; Klein and Leffler 
1981; Shapiro 1983; Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Rogerson 1986). Advertising also leads to 
repeated sales only for high quality intermediaries, while for low quality ones it only increases 
sales in the current period. Therefore it does not pay for low quality intermediaries to spend 
the costs of advertising.  
Public presentations and seminars on insurance matters are another marketing instrument to 
signal high quality services.
2 For example, an insurance intermediary may give a public 
presentation on the latest pension reforms and their consequences for old-age security. This 
comes rather close to informational advertising, since the intermediary shows publicly his 
knowledge and competence about the respective field. Thus, potential customers can gain 
some information about his service qualities. Like spending on advertising, such presentations 
also require additional costs (time and resources spent for preparing the lecture, rent for the 
lecture room etc.). Therefore, such activities only pay for high quality insurance 
intermediaries, who can reap gains from such activities over an extended time span.  
(4) Certificates and Licensing 
Certificates or licensing, provided by independent third parties, can also credibly signal high 
quality intermediary services (Spence 1973; Leland 1979a, 1979b; Shapiro 1986; Stiglitz 
1989b).
3 A wide-spread signal used in many professions is education and training. In 
revealing one’s schooling and training background, an insurance intermediary expresses 
                                                 
2   The same holds for the publication of articles about insurance topics, be it in the popular business press or in 
form of a newsletter, distributed for example through the internet. 
3   According to Carlton and Perloff (2005, 448) a certificate is “a report that a particular product has been 
found to meet or exceed a given level on a standard.”  
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information about an important input factor for producing high quality services. Deciding on 
the best insurance cover for a particular consumer’s preferences and needs requires not only 
information about insurance product alternatives on the market, but also knowledge to 
correctly assess and evaluate the relevant information. Both formal schooling as well as 
further training in the respective fields of insurance economics and financial economics 
provide an intermediary with the necessary analytical skills and theoretical knowledge. This 
investment in human capital cannot be easily copied; at least not when it comes to 
government regulated formal qualifications, as it is the case with school or university 
diplomas.  
The same holds true for vocational training and/or certificates issued by independent 
organizations, like professional associations. Membership in a professional association can 
therefore also serve as a signal, when such membership requires meeting certain standards, be 
it in terms of qualification, regular further training, and/or additional guarantees for clients 
like property liability insurance. Therefore, in case that such membership entails additional 
costs, it cannot be easily copied and thus can serve as a credible signal.  
(5) Additional Costly Investment  
In some markets lower introductory prices serve as a signal for high quality products 
(Schmalensee 1978). However, in the market for insurance intermediaries, price is not an 
action parameter, since it is customary that fees are negotiated between insurance companies 
and intermediaries. Usually they are not explicitly stated to consumers so that they act under a 
free-fee illusion. Besides, in most countries there is a ban on rebates. However, a similar 
effect may be realized by additionally offering costly services for free, which pay only if there 
are repeated transactions in the future. This may hold even for extraordinary comprehensive 
information and counseling services as well as for particular good service. Although 
intermediaries who provide only low quality services can imitate this signal, it would not pay 
off for them. After consumers have learned about the low quality these intermediaries 
provide, they will not turn to them again. Besides, they will communicate this experience to 
other consumers. As a result, a low quality intermediary cannot reap the future benefits from 
costly initial investment, because disappointing customers’ expectations about one’s service 
quality may lead to the generation of “bad” reputation.  
In addition, it may pay for high quality intermediaries to specialize in customer segments 
where demand is less elastic, consumers’ willingness to pay is higher, and/ or customer 
relationships may last longer (Farny 2000, 389-399). Given these conditions, chances are  
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higher that the initial losses of investment in extra skills, advertising or services for a 
particular customer segment pay off in the future. A lower price elasticity of demand is given 
when there are fewer substitution goods. This may hold true for example for self-employed 
persons or small and medium sized companies. These consumers simultaneously demand both 
personal and commercial insurance. They require more tailor-made coverage and, thus, more 
complex intermediation services. Insurance intermediaries have to invest in additional human 
capital to competently inform about the respective insurance. For an optimal contract 
conclusion, consumers of this target group must provide more detailed information, both 
about their private and their business lives. Thus, a more personal relationship between 
intermediary and client develops. As a consequence longer-term customer relationships and a 
lower elasticity of demand of this market segment compared to the average demand elasticity 
result. 
(6) Voluntary Property Liability Insurance 
In contrast to the other signals discussed so far, voluntary property liability insurance by an 
intermediary is a default-contingent signal. The signal sent to potential customers works as 
follows. By currently spending more resources in form of the property liability insurance 
premiums, the intermediary acknowledges the possibility that his services may lack quality 
and, thus, may cause the client damage. He assures his customers that for such a case he has 
undertaken the necessary precautions to compensate them.
4 Voluntary property liability 
insurance serves as a credible signal of an intermediary’s commitment to high quality 
services, since in case of low-quality provision the intermediary must pay higher premiums 
for his liability insurance coverage. Consequently, intermediaries providing low quality 
services have no incentives to imitate this signal. 
To summarize, the signals discussed above all can correctly signal high-quality services in the 
market of insurance intermediation, although to a different degree. Voluntary property 
liability insurance is a rather weak means, since it is accompanied by rather high transaction 
and enforcement costs. Certificates are in principle a clear-cut signal. However, if the 
organization issuing the certificate has no reputation for itself being credible, the problem for 
consumers in determining the quality of an intermediary is only shifted to determining the 
quality of a certificate. By contrast, reputation seems to be a more appropriate signal. Since it 
                                                 
4   However, liability rules must exist which impose on intermediaries’ legal liability, if they violate certain 
duties. See Spence (1977).  
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is rather expensive to build up, the necessary investment pays only for intermediaries who 
regularly provide high-quality services. Similar to that are costly additional services which 
also pay only if there are long-term customer relationships. While the same holds true for 
spending on advertising and on other promotional activities, they seem to be only second-best 
substitutes compared to investment in reputation. Finally, being an insurance broker rather 
than an exclusive or independent agent seems to be the most clear-cut signal of providing 
high-quality information services.  
4. Overview of the Empirical Literature on Signaling Information Service Quality 
While there is a large theoretical literature on signaling, there are only rather few empirical 
studies in the industrial organization literature (for an overview Riley 2001, 451-458). They 
provide evidence that warranties and brand names (i.e. reputation) work as signals for high 
product quality, while advertising and price show only a statistically weak correlation to 
product quality. The same holds for the marketing literature (for an overview Kirmani and 
Rao 2000, 74-76). Besides, following the seminal article of Spence (1973), there are a number 
of empirical studies in labor economics. They find mixed evidence (at best) that qualification 
or formal training, for example, work as credible signals (Riley, 2001, 459-467).  
So far, we are not aware of any studies explicitly testing signaling theory in the market for 
insurance intermediation services. However, the empirical literature on insurance 
intermediation supports the view that due to information asymmetries information service 
quality is generally rather low. For Germany, there are a number of descriptive studies on the 
information and counselling quality of different types of insurance intermediaries (Cap 
Gemini Ernst and Young 2002; Evers and Habschick 2000; Ökotest 2004). They mostly 
concern personal insurance lines, in particular, provision for old-age income. Typically, these 
surveys are scenario-based interviews where the participants are questioned by trained 
interviewees, who pretend to be customers interested in insurance purchase (so-called 
‘mystery shopping’). According to these studies, insurance intermediaries’ information 
quality is usually rather low. However, there are differences among different types of 
intermediaries with insurance brokers usually showing better performance. Studies which 
analyze ethical problems of insurance intermediaries in the US point in the same direction 
(Howe et al. 1994; Eastman et al. 1996). Cooper and Frank (2002) and Cooper et al. (2003) 
find that both in the US life insurance business and in the US property-liability insurance 
business the main issues deemed relevant are false or misleading information about insurance  
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products, failure to correctly identify and recommend matching insurance products for 
consumers’ needs, and lack of knowledge or skills on the side of the intermediaries.  
Besides, there are a number of studies analyzing quality differences between different 
intermediary types. They are rather heterogeneous in the level of analysis (individual 
intermediaries vs. insurance companies which use different distribution channels). However, 
they point in the same direction, that is, that the more independent insurance intermediaries 
are from insurance companies, the higher their service quality. There are also some 
econometric papers that study the service quality provided by single insurance intermediaries. 
The findings of Etgar (1976) do not support the hypothesis that independent agents provide 
overall better service quality than exclusive agents. They are significantly more active in 
claims settlement than exclusive agents, but there is mixed evidence on their service quality 
regarding assistance in risk analysis and in placing insurance applications. Cummins and 
Weisbart (1977) obtain similar results in a study on nearly 700 insurance intermediaries, 
which operate in three different US states in personal insurance lines. Again, independent 
agents are found to provide better claims settlement services and to review coverage more 
often, while they provide less service quality than exclusive agents in other dimensions. 
Eckardt (2002) provides a study based on a sample of 927 German exclusive agents and 
insurance brokers, who are mainly engaged in personal lines. Mean differences parametric 
tests reveal a number of highly significant differences in both quantitative and qualitative 
variables. They indicate that insurance brokers provide better information services than 
exclusive or independent agents. Trigo Gamarra (2007) confirms these findings for the 
German market in a study based on 608 German insurance intermediaries, using different 
quality indicators. 
There is a relatively large strand of literature which analyzes the coexistence of different 
distribution systems in insurance markets from an agency or transaction cost perspective 
(Berger et al. 1997; Regan and Tennyson 2000; Eckardt 2007, 156-158). These studies do not 
explicitly deal with the quality of the services provided by single insurance intermediaries, but 
concentrate on differences in the relative efficiency of insurance companies that use different 
distribution systems. They focus primarily on the US insurance market, in particular regarding 
property-liability insurance. The units of analysis are not insurance intermediaries, but 
insurance companies. These studies show some support for the hypothesis that firms 
employing independent agents provide better service quality than exclusive insurers (Berger 
et al. 1997).   
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Several studies use complaint data to regulatory bodies as an indicator for the service quality 
provided by insurance intermediaries. They test the hypothesis that the more complaints there 
are, the less an insurance policy sold lives up to customers’ performance expectations. 
Consequently, the insurance intermediary, who had sold the respective insurance policy, has 
provided inadequate information and advice. Doerpinghaus (1991) finds no statistically 
significant differences between the complaint ratios of direct writers and of independent agent 
insurers. In contrast, Barrese et al. (1995), who use a larger data set and a more 
comprehensive model, find evidence that independent agent insurers receive fewer complaints 
and, thus, provide better service quality compared to direct writers. Nevertheless, with 
increasing firm size this service advantage erodes.
5 
All in all, the empirical literature on signaling and on the quality of insurance intermediation 
services indicates that the distribution channel (type of insurance intermediary), reputation 
and certificates might work as credible signals for high quality services, while there is either 
no or contradictory evidence for other signals.  
5. Data, Variables and Estimation Methods 
Data 
To test whether signaling works in the market for insurance intermediation services, we use 
data from a survey among 4,687 self-employed German insurance intermediaries, which was 
carried out in autumn 2001 (see also Eckardt 2002). As there is no legal duty in Germany to 
register for insurance intermediaries, the total population is unknown. Thus, the addresses of 
the interviewees were randomly chosen from online directories and from the yellow pages. 
927 insurance intermediaries answered the questionnaire, implying a response rate of 20%. 
Among the respondents 423 are self-employed exclusive insurance agents, 67 are independent 
insurance agents and 437 are insurance brokers. Data was collected about individual and firm 
characteristics of the interviewed insurance intermediaries, the services offered, the 
intermediation process and general market conditions.
6   
                                                 
5   Wells and Stafford (1995) show that complaint ratios are a reliable proxy for consumer satisfaction with 
insurance companies and, thus, also for the service quality provided by different distribution systems. 
6   As the pretest showed a very low willingness to answer questions to remuneration patterns, costs, turnovers, 
and profits, they were omitted from the survey.  
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Variables 
Information services are intangible, so that their quality cannot be measured in an objective 
way. The dependent variable information index is an input-oriented summary indicator. It 
captures the weight that an insurance intermediary attaches to 27 subjects about a customer’s 
need for insurance protection, insurance products and coverage, policy design and contract 
terms.
7 For each item the interviewee is asked how much importance he or she gives to it in 
his counseling interviews. Answers are measured on a five-point Likert scale with 1 = totally 
unimportant to 5 = very important. Then, for each intermediary the mean value is calculated, 
after summing up all 27 items. Since participants may overstate their true service quality, 
there might be response bias. However, it can be reasonably assumed to occur similarly for all 
interviewees (Etgar 1976). As a consequence our focus is not on the values of the coefficient 
estimates reported in the regressions, but on their signs, which indicate whether the 
independent variables lead to an increase or to a decrease of the dependent variable. Besides 
there might also be selection bias in that only intermediaries providing better service quality 
answered the questionnaire. However, since the population is unknown, it is not possible to 
detect a potential selection bias in the data.  
To test hypothesis 2 we use the contract conclusion rate as dependent variable, which is a 
proxy for market performance and economic success. It indicates the percentage of 
counselling interviews an intermediary conducts that on average result in consumers actually 
concluding an insurance contract. Besides we calculate the dichotomous dependent variables 
information index-di and  contract conclusion rate-di, with the value 1 indicating above 
average information quality respectively an above average contract conclusion rate. 
In the following we present the independent variables used to test our hypotheses. The 
variable  intermediary type distinguishes between the distribution channels to which an 
interviewee belongs (exclusive agents, independent agents, insurance brokers). The German 
market for insurance intermediaries is widely unregulated (Mauntel 2004; Rehberg 2003, 178-
215).
8 There are no formal entry restrictions other than having a trading license. To get such a 
license from the Trade Supervisory Office (Gewerbeaufsichtsamt) requires only having a 
certificate issued by the police stating that the holder has no criminal record. No registration, 
                                                 
7   These items result inter alia from interviews with experts on consumer protection in personal insurance. For 
more details on the single items, see Eckardt (2007, 166-184). 
8   With the implementation of the EU Directive on Insurance Mediation in June 2007 there will be stricter 
regulations also for German insurance intermediaries, see Schönleiter (2005).  
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financial skills or financial guarantees are mandatory. Conduct regulation is also very weak. 
Disclosure regulations are of a rather general nature as well. It is neither prescribed in detail 
what information has to be passed to consumers, nor in what form has this to be done. 
However, exclusive and independent agents differ from insurance brokers in regard to their 
legal responsibilities with respect to the kind and amount of information provided to 
consumers. For exclusive and independent agents the respective insurance companies are held 
responsible in case an agent provides false or misleading information about policy benefits, 
terms and conditions, dividends or premiums. To insurance brokers more strict liability rules 
in case of professional negligence apply, although professional indemnity insurance is not 
compulsory.
9 Therefore, being an insurance broker can be seen as a signal of providing better 
information services than being an exclusive agent or independent agent (hypothesis 1). Since 
the distribution channel is easily identifiable for consumers, we also expect a higher contract 
conclusion rate for insurance brokers compared to exclusive agents or independent agents 
(hypothesis 2). 
The pretest showed that insurance intermediaries nearly unanimously held reputation to be of 
relevance for signaling high quality services. Therefore, we dropped this item from our 
survey. Instead we asked what impact different activities have for acquiring a positive 
reputation. It may result from activities intrinsically related to the provision of high quality 
information services, like comprehensive information about social and tax law, insurance 
products, or about financial products other than insurance products to cover one’s risks. 
Besides, also investment in more costly activities like in advertising, regular and frequent 
customer contacts, or qualification might contribute to positive reputation. Finally, also the 
use of ‘soft skills’ like reliable and kind service and empathy might have a positive effect on 
one’s reputation. Therefore, we test for a number of activities, which all contribute to gaining 
high reputation, whether they are credible signals and whether they are easily identifiable by 
consumers, so that it pays for insurance intermediaries to spend the related costs. Accordingly 
those intermediaries who strongly rely on them should provide better information service 
quality (hypothesis 1) and realize a higher contract conclusion rate (hypotheses 2). For eleven 
activities the participants in the survey indicated how important they perceive them for 
building a good reputation. Each item is measured on a five-point Likert scale with 
                                                 
9   In the case of long-term personal insurance like old-age insurance, usually consumers can discover the true 
quality of the information services provided by an intermediary only after contract execution, that is sometimes 
only after decades. Given this long time span, litigating insurance agents or brokers in court will not prove 
successful, since usually there will not be enough evidence available anymore  
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1=unimportant  to  5=very important. These activities refer to one of the following three 
groups: offering information, providing good service, or relying on advertising.
10 
Besides, the interviewees were asked to indicate on a list what other signals they use to see 
what market participants regard as credible and profitable signals. In regard to hypothesis 1 
we expect that customer specialization and specialization on a particular insurance company 
do not correctly indicate high quality information services. Neither are they strongly linked to 
the provision of high quality information, nor are they likely to exhibit large sunk cost. In 
contrast to that, undertaking advertising campaigns, giving professional lectures or seminars, 
holding a membership in a professional association, having qualification certificates, 
providing objective information and counseling or good service are strongly linked to the 
provision of comprehensive information or exhibit large sunk costs. Thus, they should 
credibly signal high-quality information services (hypothesis 1), although to a decreasing 
degree.  
However, in regard to hypothesis 2 – that is for signals to result in a higher contract 
conclusion rate and thus to be economically profitable – we assume that good service and 
objective information and counseling of an intermediary are not easily identifiable by 
uninformed consumers, although they are hypothesized to be credible signals. Accordingly, 
we expect that these signals have no positive impact on the contract conclusion rate. The same 
holds for customer specialization and  specialization on a particular insurance company. 
Besides, since there are quite a number of different professional associations which are 
largely unknown to the broader public, also membership in a professional association should 
not work as an easily identifiable quality signal for consumers, thus not leading to a higher 
contract conclusion rate. In contrast to these signals, professional lectures or seminars, 
qualification certificates and  advertising campaigns are effortlessly to spot, so that they 
should be associated with a higher contract conclusion rate. However, in regard to advertising 
campaigns we doubt that the typical consumer employs the sophisticated rationale behind it to 
work as a credible signal (i.e., sunk costs as a commitment to high quality services which pay 
off only if there are repeated transactions). Accordingly, we hypothesize that it has no positive 
impact on an intermediary’s contract conclusion rate. 
Finally, to control for consumers’ level of knowledge, we also inquired about the knowledge 
of an intermediary’s customers on their risk profile, on the opportunities available for old-age 
                                                 
10   A factor analysis revealed these three groups, for more details see Eckardt (2007, 174-175).  
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provisions and on the (dis-)advantages of insurance products. Each item is measured on a 
five-point Likert scale with 1=very low to 5=very high level of knowledge. Generally, the 
more knowledge consumers have about the relevant subjects, the higher the information 
quality of an intermediary is likely to be. Otherwise, customers will be dissatisfied and turn to 
another intermediary. 
Above that, we also controlled for the intensity of customers’ demand on the information 
provision and on additional services for free, since differences in the demand of different 
customers might also result in differences in the information quality provided among 
insurance intermediaries. Again, each item is measured on a five-point Likert scale with 
1=very low to 5=very high demand.  
Table 1 shows the definition and measurement of the variables, while Table 2 presents the 
main descriptive statistics. Table 3 summarizes the hypotheses to be tested, the independent 
variables and the expected relations. 
Estimation Methods 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are tested by using both OLS and logit estimations. The OLS estimations 
show whether the use of a particular signaling instrument leads to an increase in the value of 
the dependent variable (in information quality provided and/ or the contract conclusion rate). 
For the dependent variables information index and contract conclusion rate we perform linear 
OLS estimations. For the contract conclusion rate as dependent variable we apply a logistic 
function to account for the fact that it can range from 0% to 100% (Cooper/ Nakanishi 1988).  
To test for the robustness of our OLS specifications, we also perform logit estimations. In 
contrast to the OLS estimations, the logit estimations indicate the probability of 
intermediaries providing above average information quality or realizing above average 
contract conclusion rates when using a particular signaling instrument. For this we use the 
dichotomous variables information index-di and contract conclusion rate-di.  
To see whether the explanatory variables are interdependent, we proceed sequentially and 
observe coefficient reactions to additionally included groups of variables when using OLS 
(see table 2). All in all, we perform three specifications for each hypothesis. Specification I 
tests for the impact of the intermediary type and of reputational activities on the information 
service quality and on the contract conclusion rate, while specification II tests for the impact 
of other signaling instruments in addition to the intermediary type. Specification III also 
controls for consumers’ knowledge and demand besides including all other signaling  
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variables.
11 The results, which are shown in Table 4 and 5, are discussed in the following 
section.
12 
Table 1:  Definition and Measurement of Variables 
Variable  Explanation and Measurement 
Dependent Variables   
Information index  Continuous variable measuring the mean value of 27 items about the importance 
attached to different aspects in counseling interviews by the intermediary ranging 
from  
1 = very  low quality ... 5 = very high quality 
Information index-di  Dichotomous variable based on the information index variable measuring the 
information quality with 
1=above-average information quality, 0= (below-) average information quality 
Contract conclusion rate  Continuous variable measuring the proportion of the average number of counseling 
interviews on all interviews that lead to contract conclusion 
Contract conclusion rate-di Dichotomous variable measuring economic performance with 
1=above-average contract conclusion rate, 0= (below-)average contract conclusion 
rate 
Independent Variables   
Intermediary type  Set of dummy variables with 1 = intermediary type, 0 = other:  
exclusive agent; independent agent; insurance broker  
reference class: insurance broker 
Reputational activities  11 ordinal variables indicating the weight intermediaries attach to certain activities 
for gaining high reputation on a five-point Likert scale with 1 = no weight … 5 =  
very high weight: 
objective information on products; information on more favorable alternatives; 
product quality; qualification; regular information about tax law and social law; 
reliable and kind service; empathy; reliable and quick claims settlement; frequent and 
regular customer contacts; advertising efforts; reputation of the insurance company; 
Other signaling 
instruments 
8 dummy variables with 1 = signaling instrument is used, 0 = not used: 
advertising campaigns; professional lectures and seminars; membership in a 
professional association; qualification certificates; objective information and 
counseling; good service; customer specialization; specialization on an insurance 
company 
Customers’ knowledge  3 ordinal variables indicating customers’ knowledge on a five-point Likert scale with 
1 = very bad knowledge … 5 =  very good knowledge: 
risk profile; old-age protection provisions; (dis-)advantages of insurance products 
Customers’ demand  2 ordinal variables measuring consumers’ demand on a five-point Likert scale with 1 
= more modest … 5 = more demanding about: 
information provision; additional services for free 
                                                 
11   Despite a large number of explanatory variables we find no evidence for multicollinearity in our data set. 
12   For specification I the results of our estimations are given by equations 1, 4, 7, 10, for specification II by 
equations 2, 5, 8, 11 and for specification III by equations 3, 6, 9, 12.  
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Table 2: Main Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables 
  Mean  Median Minimum  Maximum 
Information index  3.70 3.70 1.41 5.00 
Information index-di  0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Contract conclusion rate  0.64 0.70 0.05 1.00 
Contract conclusion rate-di  0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Intermediary type      
Exclusive insurance agent  0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Independent insurance agent  0.07 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Insurance broker  0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Reputation      
Objective information on products  4.23 4.00 1.00 5.00 
Information on more favorable 
alternatives 
3.85 4.00 1.00 5.00 
Product quality  4.29 4.00 1.00 5.00 
Qualification   4.10 4.00 1.00 5.00 
Regular Information about tax law 
and social law 
3.22 3.00 1.00 5.00 
Reliable and kind service  4.60 5.00 1.00 5.00 
Empathy  4.46 5.00 1.00 5.00 
Reliable and quick claims 
settlement 
4.53 5.00 1.00 5.00 
Frequent and regular customer 
contacts 
3.85 4.00 1.00 5.00 
Advertising efforts  2.37 2.00 1.00 5.00 
Reputation of an insurance 
company 
3.48 4.00 1.00 5.00 
Signaling Instruments      
Advertising campaigns  0.05 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Professional lectures or seminars  0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Membership in a professional 
association 
0.77 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Qualification certificates  0.95 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Objective information and 
counseling 
0.89 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Good service  0.88 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Customer specialization  0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Specialization on an insurance 
company 
0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Customers’ knowledge      
Risk profile  2.63 3.00 1.00 5.00 
Old-age provisions  2.74 3.00 1.00 5.00 
(dis-)advantages of insurance 
products 
2.31 2.00 1.00 5.00 
Customers’ demand      
Information provision  4.02 4.00 1.00 5.00 
Additional services for free  3.75 4.00 1.00 5.00 
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Table 3: Hypotheses, Independent Variables and Expected Relations 
  Hypothesis 1:  
Intermediaries who use credible 
signals provide better (or above 
average) information service quality. 
Hypothesis 2: 
Intermediaries who use easily 
identifiable credible signals realize a 
higher (or above average) contract 
conclusion rate. 
Independent Variables  Dependent Variable and Expected Sign 




Insurance broker  +  + 
Exclusive agent  -  - 




Objective information on 
products 
+ + 









Regular Information about tax 
law and social law 
+ + 






Reliable and quick claims 
settlement 
+ + 















Professional lectures or seminars 
 
+ + 















Specialization on an insurance 
company 
0 0  
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6. Regression Results and Discussion 
OLS Estimations 
In the following, we firstly discuss the estimation results for the intermediary type, then for 
reputational activities, before we turn to the impact of other signals used by intermediaries. 
Finally, we discuss the impact of consumers’ knowledge and demand. 
As reasoned above, our findings confirm that the intermediary type is a clear-cut signal of the 
information service quality provided by an intermediary. Our estimation results give evidence 
that insurance brokers provide significantly better information quality than exclusive or 
independent agents. Like hypothesized, this also results in a significantly higher contract 
conclusion rate for insurance brokers. These results hold over all three specifications in 
equations 1 to 6.  
When looking at activities to gain good reputation, in both equations 1 and 3 the same 
variables have significant coefficient estimates with the same signs, so that these results are 
quite robust. According to these estimates the following activities are in accordance with 
hypothesis 1. If intermediaries provide objective information on insurance products, if they 
provide information on more favorable alternatives or regular information about tax and 
social law, if they offer insurance products of high quality, provide reliable and kind service 
as well as reliable and quick claims settlement and show empathy, then they also provide 
significantly better information quality. However, in contrast to hypothesis 2 nearly none of 
these activities has a significantly positive impact on the contract conclusion rate (equations 4 
and 6). Only relying on reliable and kind service and showing empathy as well as relying on 
high quality insurance products increases significantly an intermediary’s contract conclusion 
rate. This is in line with anecdotal evidence that these factors are most important for the 
economic performance of insurance intermediaries. Quite in contrast to both hypotheses 1 and 
2 is the finding that relying on advertising efforts or on the reputation of the insurance 
company, the products of which an intermediary distributes, has a significantly negative 
impact on the contract conclusion rate, while showing no significant impact on the 
information quality provided. 
Equation 2 shows the results of specification II that is, testing only for intermediary type and 
other signaling instruments.  Compared to equation 1, the overall quality of our regression for 
the information quality provided strongly decreases by nearly 32 percentage points. The same 
holds for the contract conclusion rate, albeit the adjusted R
2 in equation 5 decreases only by  
  21
around 4 percentage points compared to equation 4. Thus, our results confirm that 
reputational activities are more important than all other means to credibly signal high 
information service quality.  
When looking at the estimates for the various signals tested, we find that qualification 
certificates as well as objective information and counseling, which both show a significantly 
positive impact on the information quality provided, and customer specialization and 
specialization on an insurance company, which are of no significant impact, are in line with 
hypothesis 1. This finding is also confirmed when we control for consumers’ knowledge and 
demand in equation 3. However, it holds not for professional lectures or seminars and good 
service, since they have a significantly positive estimate only as long as not controlling for 
consumers’ knowledge and demand. Contrary to hypothesis 1 the coefficient estimates for 
advertising campaigns and for membership in a professional association show no significantly 
positive coefficient estimates. Being member of a professional association even has a 
significantly negative impact when controlling for consumers’ knowledge and demand.  
With most of the signaling instruments tested having no significantly positive coefficient 
estimates in equations 5 and 6, hypothesis 2 is widely confirmed. As we have reasoned, most 
signals are not easily identifiable by consumers so that they do not result in a higher contract 
conclusion rate. The only exception is to give public lectures or seminars, which shows a 
significantly positive coefficient estimate and, thus, is in accordance with hypothesis 2. 
Again, contrary to hypothesis 2 is the finding that being member of a professional association 
significantly decreases the contract conclusion rate.  
When controlling for customers’ knowledge in equations 3 and 6, we find that higher 
knowledge of customers on their own risk profile and on the (dis-)advantages of insurance 
products has a significantly positive impact on an intermediary’s information service quality. 
However, it does not significantly improve the contract conclusion rate. Only for 
intermediaries, whose consumers have a good knowledge on alternative options of old-age 
provisions, the coefficient estimate of the contract conclusion rate is significantly positive. In 
regard to consumers’ demand, we find that only higher demand for additional services for free 
has a significantly positive effect on intermediaries’ service quality. However, demand does 
not have a significant impact on the contract conclusion rate.  
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Table 4: Regression Results OLS 
a Dependent variable: information index; 
b Dependent variable: log(contract conclusion rate/(1- contract 











  Eq.1  Eq.2  Eq.3 Eq.4 Eq.5  Eq.6 
Constant  1.108***  3.410***  0.690*** -0.881** 0.957***  -1.019* 
  (7.000)  (34.870)  (3.728) (-2.092) (3.986)  (-1.953) 
Intermediary type           
Exclusive agent  -0.224***  -0.206***  -0.245*** -0.755*** -0.721***  -0.701*** 
 (-6.374)  (-5.409)  (-6.774) (-7.812) (-8.105)  (-6.845) 
Independent agent  -0.124**  -0.081  -0.136** -0.390**  -0.453***  -0.391** 
 (-2.190)  (-1.163)  (-2.503) (-2.401) (-2.781)  (-2.313) 
Reputational Activities           
Objective information on   0.119***    0.107*** 0.061    0.066 
products  (5.511)    (4.849) (1.037)    (1.105) 
Information on more   0.121***    0.122*** -0.010    -0.023 
favorable alternatives  (6.392)    (6.516) (-0.194)    (-0.443) 
Product quality  0.057***    0.049** 0.102    0.135** 
  (2.587)    (2.199) (1.608)    (2.077) 
Qualification   0.008    0.001 0.050    0.035 
  (0.427)    (0.076)  (0.972)    (0.657) 
Regular Information about   0.115***    0.099*** -0.008    -0.035 
tax law and social law  (5.806)    (4.816) (-0.165)    (-0.648) 
Reliable and kind service  0.055**    0.047* 0.148*    0.195** 
  (2.166)    (1.750) (1.941)    (2.448) 
Empathy  0.073***    0.082*** 0.173***    0.172*** 
 (3.273)    (3.487) (2.750)    (2.616) 
Reliable and quick claims   0.099***    0.096*** 0.088    0.094 
Settlement  (3.244)    (3.102) (1.224)    (1.282) 
Frequent and regular   -0.008    0.000 -0.022    -0.020 
customer contacts  (-0.416)    (-0.009) (-0.414)    (-0.363) 
Advertising efforts  0.006    0.000 -0.116**    -0.114** 
  (0.325)    (0.027) (-2.417)    (-2.270) 
Reputation of an   0.024    0.019 -0.096**    -0.096** 
insurance company  (1.399)    (1.087) (-2.099)    (-2.033) 
*. **. *** 10%, 5 % and 1% level of significance 
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Table 4: cont. 
Dependent Variable 
  Information 
Index
a 





  Eq.1  Eq.2  Eq.3 Eq.4 Eq.5  Eq.6 
Other signaling 
instruments 
         
Advertising campaigns    0.005  0.011  -0.200  -0.111 
    (0.053)  (0.156)  (-1.029)  (-0.561) 
Professional lectures or     0.106***  0.022   0.246***  0.273*** 
seminars    (2.685)  (0.639)  (2.698)  (2.860) 
Membership in a     -0.053  -0.057*   -0.163  -0.232** 
professional association    (-1.279)  (-1.662)  (-1.636)  (-2.271) 
Qualification certificates    0.158**  0.149**   0.140  0.036 
    (2.053)  (2.224)  (0.734)  (0.179) 
Objective information and     0.207***  0.093*   0.154  0.089 
counselling    (3.697)  (1.804)  (1.190)  (0.656) 
Good service    0.107**  -0.010  -0.022  -0.057 
    (1.978)  (-0.199)  (-0.176)  (-0.429) 
Customer specialization    -0.033  -0.042  -0.111  -0.119 
    (-0.809)  (-1.257)  (-1.137)  (-1.180) 
Specialization on an     -0.031  0.012  0.001  -0.054 
insurance company    (-0.499)  (0.220)  (0.010)  (-0.359) 
Costumers’ knowledge           
Risk profile      0.036*      0.028 
      (1.646)     (0.451) 
Old-age provisions      -0.022      0.159** 
      (-0.978)     (2.431) 
(dis-) advantages of        0.043**      -0.050 
insurance products      (2.117)     (-0.859) 
Customers’ demand           
Information provision      0.033      -0.081 
      (1.328)     (-1.303) 
Additional services for free      0.042**      -0.023 
      (2.237)     (-0.469) 
N  848  889  827 767 805  749 
F-Statistics   40.863***  6.860***  21.859*** 10.007***  9.439***  5.915*** 
adj R
2   0.379  0.062  0.396 0.132 0.095  0.146 
 




To test for the robustness of our results we also performed logit estimations for the three 
specifications tested above. The OLS estimations in equations 1 to 6 analyzed whether a 
specific signaling instrument had a significant impact on the dependent variables. In contrast 
to that, the logit estimations of equation 7 to 12 in Table 5 in the Appendix show whether the 
use of a specific signal results in the provision of above average information quality or in an 
above-average contract conclusion rate. The results of our logit estimations are mostly in line 
with those of our OLS estimations thus confirming their robustness. In particular, again for 
specification I, which is tested in equation 7, the overall quality of our regression is by nearly 
16 percentage points better than for specification II, which is tested in equation 8. It confirms 
that reputational activities are the most important means of signaling above average 
information quality.  
Equations 7 to 12 show that also when performing logit estimations the intermediary type 
significantly influences both the probability of providing above average information service 
quality as well as realizing an above average contract conclusion rate. In regard to the 
probability of providing above-average information quality, equations 7 and 9 show the same 
results as the OLS estimations in equations 1 and 3. Contrary are only the findings in 
equations 10 and 12 that reliable and kind service has no significantly positive effect and 
relying on the reputation of an insurance company has no significantly negative effect on the 
probability of an intermediary to realize an above average contract conclusion rate. 
When including other signaling instruments in equation 8, we find that only objective 
information and counseling significantly increases the probability that an intermediary 
provides above-average information quality. Besides, customer specialization shows 
significantly negative coefficient estimates in equations 8 and 9. Finally, equation 11 shows 
that, in contrast to the OLS findings, objective information and counseling significantly 
increases the probability to realize an above-average contract conclusion rate, while 
advertising campaigns show a significantly negative impact. All other coefficient estimates 
are in line with the findings of the OLS estimations. 
Also when controlling for customers’ knowledge the findings of the OLS estimations are 
confirmed. Contrary to the OLS estimates is only the finding in equation 9 that there is a 
significantly positive coefficient estimate only for customers with a high demand for 
information provision, but not for customers with a high demand for additional services for 
free.   
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Table 5: Regression Results logit 
a Dependent variable: information index-di; 
b Dependent variable: contract conclusion rate-di; (z-statistics in 
parentheses) 
Dependent Variable 
  Information 
Index-di
a 





  Eq.7  Eq.8  Eq.9 Eq.10  Eq.11  Eq.12 
Constant  -10.276***  -0.618  -12.831***  -2.048** 0.047 -2.416** 
  (-9.563) (-1.553) (-9.351)  (-1.967) (0.109) (-1.946) 
Intermediary type         
Exclusive agent  -1.107*** -0.781*** -1.351***  -1.285*** -1.187*** -1.153*** 
 (-5.561)  (-5.103)  (-6.135)  (-6.913) (-7.258) (-5.853) 
Independent agent  -0.426 -0.280  -0.566*  -0.581** -0.614**  -0.498 
 (1.441)  (-1.020)  (-1.817)  (-1.976) (-2.113) (-1.610) 
Reputational Activities         
Objective information on   0.226*   0.163  -0.027  -0.011 
products  (1.900)  (1.295)  (-0.231)  (-0.087) 
Information on more   0.522***  0.552***  0.115  0.088 
favorable alternatives  (4.912)  (5.045)  (1.170)  (0.867) 
Product quality  0.277**   0.243*  0.183   0.249* 
  (2.175)  (1.858)  (1.455)  (1.859) 
Qualification   0.066  0.040  0.115  0.085 
  (0.647)  (0.366)  (1.091)  (0.774) 
Regular information about   0.483***  0.453***  0.007  -0.057 
tax law and social law  (4.708)  (4.141)  (0.063)  (-0.496) 
Reliable and kind service  0.244*   0.208  0.085  0.199 
  (1.659)  (1.324)  (0.566)  (1.220) 
Empathy  0.228*   0.269**  0.313**  0.299** 
 (1.888)    (2.107)  (2.423)  (2.184) 
Reliable and quick claims   0.410***  0.398***  0.105  0.145 
settlement  (2.823)  (2.648)  (0.755)  (1.024) 
Frequent and regular   0.114  0.177  -0.142  -0.142 
customer contacts  (1.052)    (1.517)  (-1.405)  (-1.338) 
Advertising efforts  -0.052  -0.067  -0.235***   -0.206** 
  (-0.522)  (-0.609)  (-2.556)  (-2.124) 
Reputation of the   0.109  0.109  -0.088  -0.091 
insurance company  (1.198)  (1.139)  (-0.988)  (-0.993) 
*. **. *** 10%, 5 % and 1% level of significance 
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Table 5: cont. 
Dependent Variable 
  Information 
Index-di
a 





  Eq.7  Eq.8  Eq.9 Eq.10  Eq.11  Eq.12 
Other signaling 
instruments 
       
Advertising campaigns   -0.201  -0.309   -0.694*  -0.512 
   (-0.579)  (-0.674)   (-1.752)  (-1.333) 
Professional lectures or    0.238  -0.026   0.463***  0.550*** 
seminars   (1.511)  (-0.133)   (2.723)  (2.915) 
Membership in a    -0.101  -0.160   -0.294  -0.414** 
professional association   (-0.603)  (-0.843)   (-1.608)  (-2.122) 
Qualification certificates   0.301  0.416   0.237  -0.013 
   (0.969)  (1.074)   (0.693)  (-0.035) 
Objective information and    0.561**  0.307   0.441*  0.0372 
counselling   (2.418)  (1.072)   (1.767)  (1.355) 
Good service   0.288  -0.123   -0.176  -0.200 
    (1.336)  (-0.434)   (-0.768)  (-0.761) 
Customer specialization   -0.290*  -0.344*   0.005  -0.033 
   (1.743)  (-1.750)   (0.027)  (-0.173) 
Specialization on  an    -0.086  0.054   0.229  0.102 
insurance company   (-0.340)  (0.182)   (0.842)  (0.375) 
Costumers’ knowledge         
Risk profile     0.173     0.048 
     (1.352)     (0.400) 
Old-age provisions     -0.080     0.212* 
     (-0.608)     (1.707) 
(dis-) advantages of       0.278**     -0.072 
insurance products     (2.302)     (-0.635) 
Customers’ demand         
Information provision     0.330***     -0.163 
     (2.625)     (-1.307) 
Additional services for free     0.125     -0.047 
     (1.279)     (-0.483) 
N  848 889 827  775 814 757 
LR-statistic  225.595***  44.086***  252.404*** 105.692***  89.902***  123.784***
Mc Fadden R
2
  0.192 0.036 0.220  0.100 0.080 0.120 





The main objective of this paper was to analyze whether signaling works in the market for 
insurance intermediaries’ information services. As possible quality signals, we investigated 
the type of intermediary, the strategies to gain reputation as well as a number of other 
activities to signal high quality information services.  
According to our empirical findings, consumers can more reliably assume to be provided with 
high quality information services, if they turn to insurance brokers rather than to exclusive or 
independent agents. The same holds if an intermediary provides good service, objective 
information and counseling, uses his or her qualification level as a signal and gives public 
lectures or seminars. In addition, the following activities to gain a good reputation seem to 
work as signals of high information quality: provision of high product quality, objective 
information on products, regular information about tax and social law, information on more 
favorable alternatives, reliable and quick claims settlement, reliable and kind service as well 
as empathy.  
However, our data show that, from the perspective of the intermediary, only few instruments 
or strategies are appropriate means to increase the contract conclusion rate and thus economic 
success: acting as an insurance broker, giving public lectures and seminars, and gaining 
reputation by reliable product quality, by empathy and by reliable and kind service. Together 
with the evidence on information quality, these findings imply that consumers have severe 
difficulties in easily identifying what signals are credible. Therefore they are not capable to 
distinguish between high and low quality intermediaries. In these cases, no separating 
equilibrium will result.  
All in all, thus, our empirical evidence supports the reasoning that signaling theory, while 
assuming that consumers are not able to correctly distinguish between high and low quality 
products and services, makes too strong claims when it comes to consumers’ ability to 
identify the economic rationale behind signals used by high quality firms. Accordingly, 
signaling theory needs to pay more attention to the cognitive constraints of consumers, not 
only when it comes to assessing the quality of the goods offered, but also when it comes to 
identifying credible signals sent by intermediaries.  
In addition, our findings show evidence that market forces alone are only a weak mechanism 
to mitigate the informational asymmetries in the market for information services. Public 
policy regulation of entry as well as of conduct and disclosure are possible means to alleviate  
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the resulting problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. However, more research is 
necessary on appropriate public policy regulations to avoid unintended negative side-effects.
13 
With the insurance intermediation directive issued by the EU in 2005 to strengthen consumer 
protection, over the coming years more evidence should be available to evaluate the effects of 
public policy regulation for insurance intermediation services. 
Besides, our findings indicate that investment in the financial literacy of consumers might 
significantly increase the quality of the information services provided. The more knowledge 
consumers have on insurance relevant matters, the better service quality intermediaries must 
provide to gain potential customers. Again, there has still much further research to be done on 
appropriate public policies of how to increase consumers’ financial literacy (Braunstein and 
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